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What is the relationship between different sciences or research approaches that deal 
with the same phenomena, for instance, with the phenomena of the human mind? 
Answers to this question range from a monist perspective according to which one of 
these approaches is privileged over the others, through an integrationist perspective 
according to which they must strive to form a unity greater than the sum of its parts, to 
an isolationist perspective according to which each of them has its own autonomous 
sphere of validity. In order to assess these perspectives in this article, I discuss the 
debates about the unity of science and about explanatory pluralism. The most pressing 
issue turns out to be the choice between the integrative and the isolationist perspective: 
the question is whether the integrative tendencies in science should be fully indulged 
in or whether they should be held in check by acknowledging that a certain amount of 
isolation is necessary. I argue that the issue can be further distilled into the question of 
whether two true explanations of the same fact can ever fail to be combinable into one 
single explanation. I show that this can indeed be the case, namely, when the explana-
tions have incompatible counterfactual consequences, something that is often the case 
when we try to combine explanations from different sciences or research approaches. 
These approaches thus embody perspectives on the world that are to a certain extent 
autonomous. This leads to the conclusion that although interdisciplinarity may have 
many advantages, we should not take the project of integration too far. At the end of the 
day, the different research approaches with their different perspectives and insights must 
remain precisely that: different and somewhat disunified.
Keywords: explanatory pluralism, unity of science, disunity of science, explanation, counterfactual incompatibility, 
counterfactuals
inTrODUcTiOn
What is the relationship between the different sciences or, to use a more fine-grained term, research 
approaches that deal with the human mind? Faced with a variety of explanations for a psychiatric ill-
ness – for example, genetic, neurological, cognitive, psychoanalytic, and sociological  explanations – a 
scientist could take one of three broad views. First, the view that one explanation will trump all 
the others, making it the only one that is needed. Second, the view that these explanations can be 
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combined into one unified explanation that is superior to each 
of the individual ones. Third, the view that these explanations all 
add to our understanding, but cannot be combined into a single 
integrated account. In other words, a scientist could take a monist, 
an integrationist, or an isolationist view. Of course, combinations 
are also possible: one might believe that genetic and neurological 
explanations can be integrated, that sociological explanations 
are useful but will remain isolated, that explanations from 
cognitive psychology will be trumped by neurological ones, and 
that psychoanalytic explanations are simply wrong; or any other 
combination of options.
The distinction between these views has important practical 
consequences both for research and for therapy. If a monist 
perspective were correct, scientists and practitioners alike 
should learn to focus on the specific approach that provides the 
best explanations (which monists of today are likely to identify 
with neuroscience and low-level biological approaches to the 
human brain). But if an integrationist perspective were correct, 
researchers should focus on doing interdisciplinary research, and 
practitioners should make sure that they learn to see the intercon-
nections between different clinical approaches and find ways to 
combine them. Then again, if an isolationist perspective were 
correct, the most fruitful approach would be one of disciplinary 
specialization and parallel but isolated lines of treatment.
The general heading under which these issues used to be 
discussed was that of the unity of science, but as I will make clear 
in Section “From Unity of Science to Explanatory Pluralism,” 
 philosophers now generally talk about the issue of explanatory plu-
ralism. Those who defend explanatory  pluralism – which includes 
almost everyone engaged in the current  discussion –   generally 
reject the monist and isolationist positions in favor of some kind 
of integrationism, some version of the idea that the different sci-
ences have to work together in order to achieve results that they 
could not achieve separately. The arguments for this claim come 
in two flavors: first, arguments to the effect that interdisciplinary 
research is methodologically superior to monodisciplinary 
research, and, second, case studies that prove that scientists 
are actually pursuing such research and achieving their aims 
through it.
These methodological and empirical approaches are of 
course very valuable. But in the current paper, I would like to 
ask a more fundamental question about scientific explanation, 
namely, whether there is anything in the structure of explanations 
itself that can form a barrier to their complete integration. If two 
different research approaches come up with explanations of the 
same phenomenon, and if these are both true and not logically 
contradictory, is it then always possible to put them together 
into a single integrated perspective on the phenomenon? Or is it 
sometimes the case that we have no choice but to be isolationists, 
because the explanations themselves just do not fit together? Can 
true explanations be incompatible? These questions are pertinent. 
There may be, in our current scientific practice, a presumption in 
favor of interdisciplinarity and the integration of explanations; but 
it is far from clear that complete integration is the correct ideal to 
pursue. Perhaps there is a sense in which, say, a neurological and 
a sociological explanation of a patient’s symptoms are just “too 
different” to be forged into a single, more complete explanation.
My task in Section “Combining Explanations” will be to 
 analyze the conditions under which two explanations of the same 
phenomenon can fail to be combinable into a single explanation; 
in other words, I want to find out what it would mean for two 
explanations to be “too different.” To this end, I will develop the 
notion of counterfactual incompatibility: the idea that two state-
ments, even though they are logically consistent, can nevertheless 
imply different things about what would have happened under 
hypothetical circumstances. I then argue that explanations that 
are counterfactually incompatible cannot be combined into a 
single explanation – and far from that being a merely academic 
possibility, this does in fact regularly happen when we take expla-
nations from different research approaches.
We thus find, from studying the structure of explanations 
themselves, that there is something in the sciences that resist 
integration; that, however, much we love interdisciplinarity, there 
is an extent to which we must remain isolationists; that different 
research approaches yield perspectives on the world which can-
not always be fully integrated. Interdisciplinarity and the search 
for connections, while commendable, should be held in check by 
a healthy appreciation of the autonomy of each of the individual 
approaches scientists are using.
FrOM UniTY OF science TO 
eXPlanaTOrY PlUralisM
The 1930s saw a rising interest in the idea of the unity of science, 
which is perhaps nowhere more visible than in the activities of 
one of the fathers of logical empiricism, Otto Neurath. Neurath 
founded the Unity of Science Institute in 1936; organized a series 
of conferences between 1935 and 1941 called the International 
Congresses for the Unity of Science; and started the International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science [see Cat (1) for historical details]. 
Many of the most important philosophers of the era were impli-
cated in one or more of these enterprises, among them Philipp 
Frank, Charles Morris, Rudolf Carnap, Bertrand Russell, Ernest 
Nagel, and John Dewey.
Neurath’s own overarching concern with the unity of science 
movement was to create an environment within which the differ-
ent sciences could interact and learn from each other. As Pombo 
et al. (2) put it:
Neurath’s own encyclopedic conception of the unity of 
science is built on the notion of cooperative action in 
the scientific community and the accumulation of avail-
able results. [...] at the heart of the project is the goal 
of providing a universal medium for communicating 
across disciplines and languages (p. 4)
But although Neurath’s own view was characterized by sym-
metric and non-reductionist ideas about communication, coop-
eration, interdisciplinarity, and interaction between different 
disciplines (idem, p. 6), the idea of the unity of science was soon 
interpreted in a much more reductive way. Thus, Oppenheim & 
Putnam (3) suggests that the unity of science would be achieved 
when all the terms and all the laws of all the sciences have been 
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reduced to the terms and laws of a single scientific discipline. 
For Oppenheim and Putnam, the unity of science in this sense 
is an “over-arching metascientific hypothesis” (p. 6) which, even 
if it  cannot be conclusively shown to be true, is nevertheless 
credible (p. 8).
It is against this background that we have to understand 
the position taken up in Fodor’s classic anti-reductionist 
paper “Special Sciences, or: the Disunity of Science as a 
Working Hypothesis” (4), namely, the position that it is in 
all probability useless to search for lawful coextension of 
predicates from sciences at different levels. If unity of sci-
ence is understood in the reductionist way that Oppenheim 
and Putnam understand it, then one is indeed tempted to 
emphasize, with Fodor, the disunity of science rather than 
its unity. Few scientists are interested in strong reductionist 
projects, and thus it might seem that they have no reason to 
seek for a unity of science.
In the philosophy of science, this attitude has been force-
fully defended by Dupré (5), Cartwright (6), and Teller (7). 
They use metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological 
arguments to argue for a “disunified” and “dappled” view of 
science in which no overarching, all-encompassing laws can 
be found, and no single discipline will emerge as founda-
tional. Dupré, in fact, insists that science is not even unified 
by any common sociological, methodological, or processual 
element.
We have no quarrel with this general view, but something 
seems to be missing from it. We are still, and perhaps more than 
ever, interested in communication, cooperation, interdisciplinar-
ity, and interaction between the sciences; and we share with 
Oppenheim and Putnam, if not their views about reduction, at 
least their general aim of “counterbalancing specialization by 
promoting the integration of scientific knowledge.” Insisting, as 
Dupré, Cartwright, and Teller do, that science cannot be unified, 
helps combat reductionist ideals, but does little to shed light on 
why integration is still seen as a worthy goal.
How can we understand the unifying tendency in science 
without returning to reductionism? One option is to defend 
non-reductive unity at a metaphysical level: examples of this 
are non-reductive physicalism and the idea of the “primacy of 
physics” defended by Ladyman and Ross (8). Such metaphysi-
cal discussions will be avoided in the current paper, in order to 
focus on the methodology and the products of science. Among 
methodologically inclined philosopher of science, there seems to 
be an emerging tendency to revive a Neurathian use of the term 
“unity of science,” as some of the authors in Symons et al. (9) do. 
But more influential, especially among scientists themselves, has 
been the adoption of a new term of art for what is at bottom the 
same idea of unifying different research approaches: explanatory 
pluralism. It is this term and the debate surrounding it that we 
will focus on.
The term “explanatory pluralism” is not without problems, 
one of which is that different authors use it in sometimes quite 
different ways. But we can glean the core idea from some rep-
resentative citations, all of them from papers which set out to 
defend a form of explanatory pluralism within the psychological 
sciences:
Explanatory pluralism holds that simultaneously pur-
suing research at multiple analytical levels in science 
tends to aid progress at each of those levels [(10), p. 738]
Explanatory pluralism hypothesizes multiple mutu-
ally informative perspectives with which to approach 
natural phenomena [(11), p. 436]
On this view, different sciences have a degree of 
autonomy (they are not to be eliminated), but also 
interact in an effort to understand physical reality at 
different scales (they are not fully autonomous silos). 
[...] different sciences and theoretical approaches 
should maintain their emphasis on different propri-
etary scales but should also work to unify their work 
as much as possible, insofar as they often describe the 
same phenomena in different but compatible ways 
[(12), p. 3]
As we can see, there are two elements to the core idea: first, that 
science can be broken up into distinct enterprises, and, second, 
that it is scientifically fruitful to have interaction between these 
enterprises. The authors have different ideas about how to carve 
up science: in terms of “levels,” or “perspectives,” or “scales,” or 
simply “sciences”; but in each case, we are presumably to identify 
them with well-known disciplines and subdisciplines, such as 
high-energy physics, cell biology, neuroscience, and cognitive 
psychology. We will ignore the question of how exactly to carve 
up science and assume that speaking of research approaches is 
clear enough.
More relevant to our current purposes is the second element 
of explanatory pluralism, namely, the idea that the sciences have 
to interact in order to achieve their full potential. As we can see, 
this claim is formulated in different ways by the different authors. 
McCauley and Bechtel frame it as a prediction about the rate of sci-
entific progress, although one that is not, perhaps, especially clear, 
since it is not evident which contrast they are drawing. Kendler 
formulates explanatory pluralism as a methodological norm and 
contrasts it with reductionism. Abney et  al. take explanatory 
pluralism to be an alternative not only to reductionism but also to 
an isolationist view of science that they attribute – perhaps inac-
curately, since his article opposes reduction but not interaction 
in general – to Fodor (4). Given our interest in finding a middle 
ground between the unity and the disunity of science, this is an 
especially interesting version of the explanatory pluralism. But 
the formulation of Abney et al. remains vague: it exhorts us to 
unify the sciences “as much as possible,” but it does not indicate 
how far that possibility extends.
Some of the most thoughtful analyses of explanatory plural-
ism are those of Marchionni (13), Mitchell (14), Campaner (15), 
and Van Bouwel (16). [Closely related, though couched in a 
different terminology and less focused on the technical details of 
explanation, is Brigandt (17) account of explanatory integration 
as an intermediate between reductionism and pluralism.] All 
these authors take the view that explanatory pluralism is primar-
ily about what explanations the best science will end up with, 
and more precisely about the question whether explanations 
from different research approaches can all be integrated into a 
coherent whole.
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Marchionni (13) makes a distinction between two ways in 
which explanations of the same phenomenon on a macro and 
micro level can complement each other: weak complementarity, 
which holds when the two explanations are both legitimate 
and autonomous, but cannot be combined; and strong com-
plementarity, which holds when the two explanations can be 
integrated into a whole that provides a better explanation than 
the two explanations did separately. If weak complementarity 
holds, we have two research approaches that are essentially 
independent; this is a disunified or isolationist view of science. 
When strong complementarity holds, our best understand-
ing of the world is generated when two or more research 
approaches interact: this is a unified or integrationist view. We 
thus arrive at a gliding scale ranging from the ultimate unity 
that is reduction/ monism, to the ultimate disunity that is weak 
complementarity/isolationism, with strong complementarity/
integrationism in between.
However, the idea of strong complementarity involves a 
certain instability. On the one hand, it poses different, distinct 
research approaches; and on the other hand, it tells us that the 
results of these approaches can be put together to form a single 
picture of the world, a picture that is more enlightening than any 
of the separate pictures. But if the sciences are to be integrated 
so tightly and do not have an autonomous domain of knowledge 
wherein they reign supreme, in what sense can they still be said 
to be distinct? Do they not reveal themselves as merely different 
parts of the same one-and-only scientific discipline?
This seems to be the background against which Campaner 
(15), in an attempt to explain how different kinds of psychiatric 
explanation can be combined, asks the following pertinent ques-
tions about explanatory pluralism:
Is there any underlying idea that some sort of complete 
explanatory picture can be – sooner or later –  elaborated, 
or is some more radical form of pluralism advanced 
here? Is pluralism suggested here as only the acknowl-
edgement of the existence and toleration of a diversity 
of current explanatory theories, or also as the idea that 
distinctive views will persist as such in the long run? In 
other terms, is actual plurality treated in this context as 
provisional and resolvable, or is the idea that renounc-
ing pluralism would lead to some loss of explanatory 
information? (pp. 98–99)
Unlike Marchionni, who comes out in favor of strong comple-
mentarity, Campaner believes that the different types of explana-
tion in psychiatry will turn out to be impossible to integrate into 
a single type of explanation. She points at the very different aims 
and interests of different actors in the field of psychiatry, and she 
argues that there is little reason to suppose that the explanations 
constructed to advance those different interests will coincide, 
even in the long run. According to her, we must be “open to the 
possibility that, at least in principle, explanatory pluralism can be 
a permanent state” (idem, p. 101), where explanatory pluralism 
is here understood – justifiably, but somewhat confusingly when 
compared to Abney et  al.  –  as the isolationist rather than the 
integrationist position.
Van Bouwel (16), in a commentary on Campaner and using 
and expanding the earlier classification of Mitchell (14), adds 
another level of sophistication to the analysis. Next to explana-
tory reductionism, Van Bouwel distinguishes no fewer than five 
different kinds of explanatory pluralism, ranging from the more 
monistic to the more pluralistic:
 1. Explanatory reductionism: there is a single privileged research 
approaches, and ultimately the best understanding of the 
world will be achieved when all the explanations from other 
approaches are reduced to this privileged approach.
 2. Temporary pluralism: it is methodologically advisable to pro-
mote a temporary plurality of competing theories, as a means 
of achieving, in the end, one single unified theory that gives 
the best explanations.
 3. Integrative pluralism: satisfactory explanations can only be 
generated by integrating the findings of different research 
approaches. (This is equivalent to always embracing 
Marchionni’s idea of strong complementarity.)
 4. Interactive pluralism: research approaches often generate satis-
factory explanations by themselves, but it is also often – though 
not invariably – the case that the integration of explanations 
from different sciences leads to a better explanation. (This 
position, which is Van Bouwel’s preferred position, posits a 
mixture of Marchionni’s two kinds of complementarity.)
 5. Isolationist pluralism: different research approaches generate 
very different kinds of explanation, which are all valid but 
cannot be integrated. (This is equivalent to always embracing 
Marchionni’s idea of weak complementarity.)
 6. Anything goes pluralism: all theories and perspectives are 
equally valid, and the greatest understanding of the world 
is achieved by an unlimited proliferation of theories and 
perspectives.
Van Bouwel is undoubtedly right when he suggests that it 
would be tough to defend either the idea that isolation is always 
correct or the idea that integration is always correct. Interactive 
pluralism, which decides on a case-to-case basis whether integra-
tion will succeed or whether isolation is needed, seems to be the 
most rational position. But in its relaxed wait-and-see attitude, 
it misses out on something that is more adequately captured by 
the admonitions of McCauley, Bechtel, Kendler, and Abney et al. 
all of whom push toward integration. There is a methodological 
presumption in science in favor of integration: where we can 
integrate, one feels, we should integrate; after all, pushing toward 
integration has led to many great advances.1 The scientist who 
insists on the splendid isolation of her discipline will come 
under immediate suspicion for being, perhaps, too conservative. 
“Interdisciplinarity” remains a word with which one can woo 
funding agencies. In other words, we love the unity of science, we 
are striving toward the unity of science, and if we fail to achieve 
1 See also Andler (18), pp. 140–141, for an appraisal of why we cannot ignore 
the unifying tendencies in science. Of course, there are critics of integration and 
interdisciplinarity too, but I venture – although I have no hard data to back this 
up – that most of these critics have doubts about the possibility of integration, rather 
than about the desirability of integration where this is possible.
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it – that is, more specifically, if we fail to achieve an integrative 
pluralism where all the sciences work together to create one single 
coherent explanation of every phenomenon – than there must be 
some particular obstacle in the way of that integration. It is that 
obstacle that I wish to consider. Is the scientist who believes that 
her explanations stand alone and cannot fruitfully be combined 
with those of other sciences automatically an unintelligent con-
servative, or are there circumstances under which it is rational to 
embrace an isolationist pluralism? What, we may ask more spe-
cifically, are the circumstances under which two explanations can 
fail to be combinable into a single, more complete explanation?
Answering that question will be the burden of the Section 
“Combining Explanations” of this paper. But before I embark 
on that project, it will be useful to mention Van Bouwel’s own 
approach to this question and distinguish my project from his. 
According to Van Bouwel et al. (19):
[e]xplanatory pluralism consists in the claims that (i) the 
best form (and level) of explanation depends on the kind 
of question one is willing to answer by the explanation 
and (ii) that in order to answer all explanation-seeking 
questions in the best way possible we will need more 
than one form (and level) of explanation (p. 36)
The approach championed by these authors, which also influ-
ences Gervais’ (20) account of inter-level explanations, starts 
not from a phenomenon, to then ask whether different research 
approaches should cooperate in giving a single explanation of that 
phenomenon, but starts from the idea that different epistemic 
interests lead to different explanatory questions that are best 
answered by explanations involving different forms and levels. 
This more pragmatic approach to explanation leads to a natural 
answer to the questions I posed above: yes, one can say, it is 
rational to believe that isolation is sometimes the best strategy, 
because under some circumstances narrow isolated explanations 
are more conducive to our specific epistemic goals than grand 
integrative stories. [In their 2011 article, Van Bouwel et al. (19) 
are actually concerned with showing that reductive explanations 
have a place in science next to high-level explanations, but I take 
it that they would also agree with the approach to isolation I just 
outlined.] Actual examples of science can then be used to prove 
that scientists indeed choose between integration and isolation 
based on pragmatic and contextual factors.
I have no quarrel with such an approach. Suppose, for a 
moment, that there is indeed a single best, completely integrated 
explanation of any phenomenon. Then, it is undoubtedly 
true – and I would expect even hard reductionists to agree – that 
there are strong pragmatic reasons against using this explana-
tion to answer any and all questions about that phenomenon. 
A therapist interested in curing her patient’s depression might 
not need to hear about the details of the patient’s neurochemistry 
in order to prescribe the right cure, while the patient’s company 
doctor might need to know nothing at all about the causes of 
the depression in order to decide whether or not to grant the 
patient extended sick leave. In practical contexts, the “best” 
explanation is often simple and idealized. And it would also be 
true, as the pragmatist might stress, that in practice we tend to 
lose important insights and information if we do not keep our 
practical goals in mind from the start, so that there is a more 
fundamental, if still practical, reason for pursuing isolated 
rather than integrated explanations.
So, even if it were true that there is a single best, completely 
integrated explanation of any phenomenon  –  where “best” is 
understood not in a pragmatic and contextual way, but in terms of 
an ideal state of understanding – there are still legitimate practical 
concerns about integration. But I want to know whether that sup-
position, which seems to underlie much of the theoretical defense 
of integration, is true. If it is, then the sciences are fundamentally 
one, at least as far as explanation is concerned; and we will reach 
the most perfect understanding of the world when we relentlessly 
pursue integration. If not, then the sciences are fundamentally a 
plurality; and we will lose some understanding if we push our 
quest for integration too far.
cOMBining eXPlanaTiOns
Is there a single best, completely integrated explanation of any 
phenomenon? There are instances where one might doubt this 
for reasons having to do with what the explanations are about. 
For instance, one might doubt whether explanations involving 
the mind and explanations involving the body could ever be 
combined; or explanations involving facts and explanations 
involving values. These doubts are related to some of the thorniest 
metaphysical issues in all of philosophy. We will sidestep these 
issues – which we could not possibly do justice to here – and focus 
instead, not on what explanations are about, but on the general 
form or structure of explanations. What I want to know is what 
general feature of two explanations of the same phenomenon 
could stand in the way of their being combined into a single big-
ger explanation.
In order to simplify the discussion, I will make two assump-
tions. First, I will assume that the things that get explained by 
explanations – with a technical term, the explananda – are facts, 
and that these facts can be put into a contrastive form, that is, an 
“A rather than B” form. An explanation thus may explain why 
Tom is depressed rather than not being depressed; or why he is 
depressed rather than manic; or why he has been depressed since 
August rather than having been depressed for a longer or shorter 
time. Not much in the discussion will hinge on this assumption, 
but settling on one specific form of explanandum will increase 
both brevity and clarity. In addition, it has been made by many 
authors working on scientific explanation, from Van Fraassen (21) 
to Woodward (22).
When we start thinking about features of explanations that 
could stand in the way of their being combined, one rather trivial 
feature will come to us immediately: logical inconsistency. If I 
explain Tom’s depression from that fact that he has been work-
ing too much and you explain it from the fact that he has been 
jobless, we are contradicting each other and no integration is 
possible. In order to avoid this, I will stipulate that in all the 
examples to be discussed later on, the explanations given are 
true; and furthermore, I assume – this is my second substantive 
assumption – that true statements are always logically compat-
ible. Many will regard this assumption as a self-evident truth; 
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I myself do not; but I will assume its truth here in order to focus 
on the issues at hand.
Given this second assumption, there seems to be a strong 
presumption in favor of the idea that all explanations of the same 
explanandum will be combinable. After all, we can simply put 
them together; there being no logical incompatibility, nothing 
could stop us from doing so. This, I take it, is precisely why 
integrative approaches to science are so intuitively persuasive: 
if all our final theories are true, it surely must be possible to 
combine them. But of course, there are many ways to “combine” 
explanations, and it behooves us to take stock of them – and of 
any presuppositions they entail – before coming to a judgment 
about the matter.
In the following, I will identify three ways in which expla-
nations can be combined: by presenting additive causes, by 
presenting different parts of a single causal tree, or by describing 
supervening levels. After a brief discussion of these three kinds 
of compatibility, I will argue that all of them share a basic pre-
supposition that I will call counterfactual compatibility. This will 
suggest a way that even true, logically consistent explanations 
of the same fact can fail to be combinable: by counterfactual 
incompatibility.
As our example explanandum, let us take the fact F that patient 
P suffers from major depressive disorder (MDD), rather than not 
suffering from it. Let us postulate that P’s MDD can be causally 
linked to a life history that has led to self-esteem and relationship 
issues; that the depression has been triggered by the loss of a job 
and the death of his best friend; that on a neural level the depres-
sive symptoms are caused by, among other things, a disruption of 
neuroplasticity; and that P’s self-esteem issues can be related to 
the exaggerated expectations his authoritarian father had of his 
only son. Given this situation, both of the following are acceptable 
explanations of F:
 (1) P suffers from MDD because he lost his job.
 (2) P suffers from MDD because his best friend died. These 
explanations both present causal factors that increased the 
likelihood of a depression and were in fact causally linked 
to it. Irrespective of whether either of them was sufficient 
for the occurrence of MDD, or whether both together were 
needed to trigger it, these causes can be added to each other 
in a single, more encompassing explanation: 
 (3) P suffers from MDD because he lost his job and his best friend 
died. This is what I call the presentation of additive causes: 
when two or more explanations present different causal fac-
tors that are independent but both increase the probability 
of the explanandum, we can simply combine them into a 
single conjunctive causal factor that is more informative 
than either of the factors alone. Of course, it is also possible 
that a set of explanations presents causal factors that are not 
independent, but that depend on each other because they are 
causally linked. Take, for instance, the following:  
 (4) P suffers from MDD because he lost his job and has been 
unable to find a new one.
 (5) P suffers from MDD because he has self-esteem issues, 
which made him ineffective in his last job and caused him 
to lose it. The loss of his job triggered MDD.
 (6) P suffers from MDD because the economy is in a slump and 
that has made him unable to find a new job. If he had found a 
new job soon after losing his last one, MDD would not have 
been triggered.
The relationship between these explanations is that each of 
them traces out a different part of a single causal tree, where a 
causal tree is the structure that is generated by providing the 
direct causes of one event, and then continuing to provide causes 
for any event in the tree whose causes have not been given yet. 
In this case, (4) explains F by giving two of its causes: the loss 
of the job and the inability to find a new one. (5) explains F by 
giving only one of those causes – the loss of the job – but by also 
explaining what caused that cause, thus moving up a level in the 
explanatory tree. Explanation (6) gives another of the causes of 
F – the inability to find a new job – and gives the causes of that 
cause. It is of course possible to combine (4–6) into a single, more 
complete description of the explanatory tree:
 (7) P suffers from MDD because he has self-esteem issues and 
because the economy is in a slump. The self-esteem issues 
caused him to be ineffective at his last job, which in turn 
caused him to be fired. Because of the economic slump, he 
has been unable to find a new job. The prolonged jobless-
ness was one of the things that triggered P’s current episode 
of MDD.
This is what I call the presentation of different parts of a causal 
tree. Of course, the addition of causes and the presentation of 
different parts of a causal tree can be combined more or less ad 
infinitum in order to trace out the entire causal history of the 
event in the explanandum. Each of the explanations gives a dif-
ferent part of the tree, gives us a different set of events and causal 
links between them, and as this proceeds, we know about a larger 
part of the tree and understand the explanandum better.
These two ways of combining explanations are straightforward 
and important in practice, but they pose few theoretical problems. 
Things become more interesting when we move to two explana-
tions like these:
 (8) P suffers from MDD because he has a high stress level and 
stress causes the symptoms known as depression.
 (9) P suffers from MDD because he has abnormal levels of cor-
tisol, serotonin, and norepinephrine. These abnormal levels 
reduce the neuroplasticity of P’s brain, which in turn causes 
the symptoms known as depression.2
We cannot understand (8) and (9) as tracing out different parts 
of a causal tree, for the simple reason that – at least on stand-
ard theories of the mental  –  they trace out the same part, but 
described at different levels or in different vocabularies. Where 
(8) speaks about stress, (9) speaks about the abnormal levels of 
2 For the potential relation between stress hormones, neuroplasticity, and depres-
sion, see Maletic et al. (23) and Pittenger and Duman (24).
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certain hormones, but these are two descriptions of the same 
state. It is both possible and enlightening to combine (8) and (9):
 (10) P suffers from MDD because he has a high stress level, 
which involves him having abnormal levels of cortisol, 
serotonin, and norepinephrine. These abnormal levels 
reduce the neuroplasticity of P’s brain, which in turn causes 
the symptoms known as depression.
Philosophical questions about this situation remain, especially 
about the status of the word “involves” in (10). Is having stress 
identical to having certain hormonal levels, or does having stress 
instead supervene3 on hormone levels? If it supervenes, could 
there be a reduction of theories about stress to theories about 
hormones, or are reductions impossible? Might it even be the 
case that this description of the situation is wrong, and that stress 
and certain hormone levels are merely accidentally cooccurring? 
Such questions are familiar from the philosophy of mind and will 
not be resolved any time soon. But for our current discussion, it 
turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that the answers to these ques-
tions make no difference. On any of the options in the debate, 
either (8) and (9) can be combined into (10) or at least one of 
them is false:
•	 On a reductionist theory, the two explanations are simply 
saying the same things in different vocabularies; once this is 
seen, the combination is trivial, because it turns out that there 
is nothing to combine.
•	 On a non-reductionist theory which sees psychological 
notions like “stress” as supervening on neurochemical states, 
the two explanations can both be given, and then linked 
through supervenience relations to result in a more complete 
explanation. This is what I will call the description of superven-
ing levels.
•	 On a non-reductionist theory that rejects the supervenience 
thesis and instead believes that psychological events such 
as stress and neurochemical events such as high hormone 
levels are wholly distinct but related through the relation of 
causation, the two explanations can be combined by giving the 
causal interrelations between them. In this case, combining 
(8) and (9) into (10) turns out to be a case of presentation of 
different parts of a causal tree.
•	 On a radical dualist theory which sees mental events like stress 
and physical events like hormone levels as wholly distinct and 
non-interacting, explanation (9) must be false, for hormone 
levels cannot cause stress. So in this case, too, we do not have 
two true explanations of the same phenomenon that cannot be 
combined; we have a true and a false explanation, and the false 
explanation must be rejected.
3 Supervenience is a notoriously difficult term to define adequately, but in this 
article, I will take it to be the relation such that (a) the values of supervening 
properties at time t are fully determined by the values at time t of the properties 
they supervene on, but (b) the supervening properties cannot be identified with the 
supervened-on properties. Many philosophers have defended the idea that while, 
say, mental states are not identical to brain states; nevertheless, our brain states fully 
determine our mental states. If this is so, then mental states supervene on brain 
states in the sense I am using the term here.
Which of these options is correct will be highly relevant to 
our view of the relation between psychology and neuroscience. 
But what anyone can seemingly agree on is that once we have 
found the true explanations, those explanations can be combined 
into a single story – either by identifying them, by linking them 
through supervenience relation, or by linking them through 
causal relations.
Having seen three important ways in which true explanations 
can be combined, and are combined in practice, we are still faced 
with the question of whether there are any conditions under 
which they cannot. To answer that question, we must think about 
what explanations are and how something could fail to be an 
explanation, even though its parts are explanations.
When we do think through the properties of explanations, we 
quickly find that they are not merely lists of unconnected facts. 
Explanations always trace links between the fact to be explained 
and other facts. Different theories of explanation have different 
ideas about what these links are like: according to Hempel’s origi-
nal DN-model, explanations show how the fact to be explained 
can be derived from other facts through laws of nature; according 
to unificationist theories, explanations show how the fact to be 
explained can be derived using unifying arguments; according 
to causal theories of explanation, explanations explain a fact by 
giving its causal antecedents [see Salmon (25) and Woodward 
(26) for overviews]. But what all these theories have in common, 
and what is indeed one of the central facts about explanation 
that any theory of explanation would have to do justice to, is that 
explanations allow us to draw counterfactual conclusions about 
the explanandum. To know that P suffers from MDD is to know 
something important; but to understand why P suffers from MDD 
is to have, in addition, a measure of insight into the conditions 
under which he would not have suffered. Explanations allow us 
to make claims about what would have happened in different 
circumstances. And this is indeed one of the prime reasons that 
we are interested in explanations at all, for by allowing us to see 
what would happen in different circumstances, they allows us to 
make an informed choice between different courses of action. 
[For more on the relation between explanation, causation, and 
counterfactuals, see Chapter 3 of Woodward (22).]
If one of the central obligations on an explanation is to allow 
us to draw counterfactual conclusions about the explanandum, 
then it is reasonable for us to require explanations to fulfill that 
obligation. To be precise, it is reasonable to ask of any explana-
tion that the counterfactual consequences that follow from it are 
consistent: that is, that we cannot show from it both that if A had 
happened, C would have happened; and that if A had happened, 
C would not have happened. In other words, the counterfactual 
picture painted by any explanation should be coherent.
This in turn suggests a condition that two explanations of 
the same fact have to fulfill in order to be combinable into a 
single explanation: they should not have logically incompatible 
counterfactual consequences. If they do not, we will call them 
counterfactually compatible. If, on the other hand, they do have 
logically incompatible counterfactual consequences, we will call 
them counterfactually incompatible. The claim I am making, then, 
is that two true explanations of the same fact are combinable into 
one explanation only if they are counterfactually compatible. 
March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 328
Gijsbers Explanatory Pluralism and the (Dis)Unity of Science
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org
(This is a necessary condition. Perhaps it is also sufficient, but I 
have no argument to that effect.)
In all our previous examples, the explanations were indeed 
counterfactually compatible. Both (4) and (5) imply that if P had 
not lost his job, he would not have had MDD. In addition, (5) 
implies that if P had not had self-esteem issues, he would not have 
lost his job; this is of course compatible with the previous claim. 
Both (4) and (6) imply that if P had been able to find a new job 
soon, he would not have had MDD. In the case of (8) and (9), the 
counterfactual implications are different but logically compatible: 
(8) implies that P would not have suffered from MDD if he had 
not suffered from stress, whereas (9) implies that P would not 
have suffered from MDD if his hormone levels had been normal; 
and these two claims are perfectly consistent on both reductive 
and non-reductive theories of the mental.
We must now ask ourselves whether it is ever possible for two 
true explanations to be counterfactually incompatible. Let us first 
look at an example involving two very different explanations of 
the same fact, one from the perspective of textbook physics and 
one from the perspective of common sense teleology. Suppose 
that a door in my living room is open rather than closed. Why? 
Here are two explanations:
 (11) The door is open because a force greater than F was applied 
to it from the inside while the handle was down.
 (12) The door is open to allow fresh air to get in.
Both of these explanations can be true at the same time. But 
now let us ask the following question: would this door have been 
open if it had been a door to the cellar instead of a door to the 
garden? The physicist, with (11) in hand, would say that, yes, the 
door would still have been open. After all, cellar doors do not have 
physical properties that make them physically more difficult to 
open than garden doors. But the common sense thinker, looking 
at (12), would say no, the door would have been closed if it had 
been a cellar door. After all, cellar doors are not opened to let in 
fresh air. Who of the two is right? Would this door have been open 
if it had been a door to the cellar? Well, yes and no – it depends 
on the perspective we are taking. But this means that the explana-
tions from the two perspectives, while both valid and true, fail the 
test of counterfactual compatibility and cannot be combined into 
a single coherent explanation.
One might object that any incompatibility here is the result of 
the incompatibility of a broadly causal and a broadly teleological 
perspective; and one might then go on to claim that teleology has 
no place in science. If that is true, then examples like the one above 
could show at most that science cannot always be integrated with 
common sense; but this does not disprove the integrationist claim 
that the sciences themselves are always capable of being integrated. 
Perhaps this is true; although it would already be an interesting 
result, since discussions about teleology are by no means dead in 
science. But counterfactual incompatibility can in fact also arise 
between two perspectives that are both purely causal.
Let us return to our poor patient P, and let us ask the following 
question: suppose that P had been a woman, would he still have 
suffered from MDD? One way to approach this question –  the 
approach that would be favored by a neuroscientist – would be 
to review the differences between male and female brains. Let 
us supposes that there is no systematic difference between the 
sexes such that female brains handle abnormal levels of cortisol, 
serotonin, and norepinephrine differently from male brains. 
Then, the neuroscientist would pronounce, correctly and with 
ample justification, that if P had been female, (s)he would still 
have suffered from MDD.
But the question could also be answered by P’s therapist, who 
has been especially interested in talking through his life history 
with him, with a special emphasis on traumatic events from his 
early childhood. According to this therapist the crucial cause of 
P’s self-esteem issues is the way P’s father treated his only son; 
a way that was markedly different from the way he treated his 
daughters. The therapist thus comes to the conclusion – just as 
correct and just as justified as that reached by neuroscientist – that 
if P had been a woman, (s)he would not have suffered from MDD.
There is nothing especially mysterious about this situation. 
Different scientific perspectives on P naturally lead to differ-
ent ways of evaluating counterfactual claims about him. For 
a neuroscientist, contemplating the influence of gender means 
contemplating the way that gender has influenced the structure 
and functioning of the patient’s brain. For the therapist, contem-
plating the influence of gender means contemplating the way 
that gender has influenced the patient’s life history. Both of these 
perspectives are equally valid, and both lead to explanations that 
should be accepted. But these explanations cannot be accepted 
into one single coherent explanation; for combining them leads to 
a story in which P would both have suffered from MDD and not 
suffered from MDD if he had been a woman. So, the therapist’s 
life-history approach and the neuroscientist’s approach have 
to remain isolated to a certain extent. Here, we have a case of 
counterfactual incompatibility; and in general, counterfactual 
incompatibility may occur when we try to integrate explanations 
from different research approaches. When it does, it acts as a 
barrier to integrative pluralism.
This conclusion could be attacked in two ways. First, one 
could attack the claim that counterfactual compatibility is a 
requirement for two explanations to be combined. Now, admit-
tedly, by choosing a suitable low standard for what “integration” 
means, one can always claim that two research approaches can 
be integrated. But counterfactual incompatibility is a real barrier 
to any substantive kind of integration, because it means that we 
cannot simply transfer conclusion reached in one approach to 
the other approach. If the neuroscientist finds that gender is 
irrelevant to MDD, the therapist or the sociologist cannot just 
accept that conclusion; for the conclusion, while true –  in our 
example  –  from the neuroscientific perspective, might well be 
false from the other perspectives. This non-transferability of 
counterfactual conclusions is surely a good reason to hold that 
the different research approaches are to some extent isolated and 
autonomous.
Second, one could claim that, my examples notwithstanding, 
counterfactual compatibility cannot occur between true explana-
tions. For, one could argue, it is logically impossible that “if A had 
happened, then B would have happened” and “if A had happened, 
then B would not have happened” are both true. To substantiate 
this conclusion, one could appeal to influential theories about the 
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truth conditions of counterfactuals. Lewis (27), for instance, tells 
us that “if A had happened, then B would have happened” is true 
just in case that B is true in the closest possible world where A is 
true, where the closeness of possible worlds is defined in terms of 
their similarity to ours. If such a story were correct, and, crucially, 
if similarity were a non-contextual affair, something that should 
be evaluated in the same way across all the sciences, then either 
the therapist or the neuroscientist would have to be wrong. To see 
which, we would have to find out which world is more similar to 
ours, the one envisaged by the therapist or the one envisaged by 
the neuroscientist. And whichever of them in their imaginative 
flights stayed closer to home, so to speak, would be the person 
drawing the correct counterfactual conclusions.
Such a procedure, however, has very little to recommend itself. 
Theories about the truth conditions of counterfactuals should 
respect our everyday evaluations of counterfactuals; and it is an 
undeniable fact that people working from different perspectives 
use different scenarios to evaluate the same counterfactual claims. 
As Lowe (28) points out, the truth conditions of counterfactuals 
are highly context-dependent. Lowe then argues (pp. 54–55) that 
the context influences how we evaluate claims about the similarity 
of possible worlds, and that this context is at least partly defined 
by the intentions of the speaker. For our current purposes, we 
can slightly modify his proposal and state that the context within 
which counterfactuals are evaluated is at least partly defined by the 
research approach within which the claim appears. Counterfactual 
evaluation in neuroscience takes scenarios into account that are 
ignored in the therapeutic setting, and the other way around. The 
different sciences use different relevance criteria; and this does 
not make a difference not only for which facts they uncover but 
also for how they reason about counterfactual scenarios. Since 
explanations are tightly connected to counterfactual scenarios, 
these differences between research approaches translate into an 
incompatibility of the explanations they generate.
This concludes my argument for the claim that I set out to prove, 
namely, that true explanations of the same fact sometimes cannot 
be combined into a single bigger explanations. Counterfactual 
incompatibility is a barrier to such combination, and counter-
factual incompatibility is real. This result nicely mirrors that of 
Lange (29). His point is that different research approaches take 
different sets of counterfactuals seriously, and that this leads to 
incompatible laws; my point is that different research approaches 
sometimes reach incompatible results when evaluating identical 
counterfactuals. Both points support the conclusion that research 
approaches can be expected to be at least partly autonomous.
Let me end this section by professing ignorance about two 
points. First, I am not sure whether counterfactual incompatibility 
can also occur within a single research approach – e.g., whether 
two true neurological explanations of a brain phenomenon could 
ever turn out to be incompatible. If this were possible, science 
would be even more disunified than we tend to think. Second, 
I do not know whether this section has covered all the ways in 
which explanations can be combinable or fail to be combinable. 
In this respect, I make no claim to having exhausted the territory.
cOnclUsiOn
My analysis of the debate surrounding the unity of science and 
explanatory pluralism revealed that the most pressing issue lies 
in the choice between integrative and isolationist pluralism; or 
rather, in finding out whether the integrative tendencies present 
in current science should be fully indulged in, or should be held in 
check by affirming that a certain amount of isolation is unavoid-
able. I further distilled this issue into the question of whether two 
true explanations of the same fact could ever fail to be combin-
able into one single explanation. It turns out that although many 
explanations are in fact combinable, this only holds when they 
have compatible counterfactual consequences. I then argued that 
true explanations from different sciences can have incompatible 
counterfactual consequences. This leads us to the general conclu-
sion that a certain amount of isolation between the sciences is 
indeed both present and unavoidable; forcing all the sciences to 
use the counterfactual relevance criteria of one of them would 
rob us of part of the insight that the different sciences can give 
us and would lead to the uncritical transfer of counterfactual 
claims from one science into another, with potentially disastrous 
results (in the case of, e.g., a sociologist who rejects the possibility 
that gender could be related to psychological conditions because 
the neuroscientists tell him that there is no such relation). This 
does not mean that we should not strive for integration and the 
benefits of interdisciplinarity. But it does mean that we should 
not take this project too far, for, at the end of the day, there will 
still be the different sciences with their different perspectives and 
insights. The plurality of the sciences is to be cherished rather 
than combated.
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